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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff Jody Best (represented by attorney John Walsh) sued three defendants: 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("DCC"), Larry H. Miller Chrysler Jeep ("Miller") and Dan 
Worth d/b/a Worth's Custom Body and Paint ("Worth"). 
DCC was initially represented by Patricia Christensen of Parr, Waddoups, Brown 
Gee & Loveless in Salt Lake City. The representation of DCC was subsequently 
assumed by Dale Lambert and Nathan Alder of Christensen & Jensen, P.C., in Salt Lake 
City. On May 1, 2001, Peter Jones of Hall & Evans, L.L.C., in Denver, entered his 
appearance pro hac vice as co-counsel on behalf of DCC. 
Miller was originally represented by Donald Winder and John Holt of Winder & 
Haslam, P.C., in Salt Lake City. The representation of Miller was subsequently assumed 
by Dale Lambert and Nathan Alder of Christensen & Jensen, P.C., and Peter Jones of 
Hall & Evans, L.L.C. 
Worth was represented throughout by Kara Pettit of Snow Christensen & 
Martineau in Salt Lake City. Although all three defendants were initially appellees in this 
appeal, Worth has been dismissed. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court correctly enter summary judgment? 
Standard of review: An entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc.. 988 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1999). The appellate court 
determines whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation in record: This issue was preserved in the briefs submitted for and 
against, and at the hearing on, defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment. (R. 
1393-1566, 1574-1612, 1624-1700, 1996). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court properly consider the affidavits submitted by 
defendants' expert witness, Michael Cassidy? 
Standard of review: The trial court has discretion to determine the qualifications 
of an expert witness. Schindlerv. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989). 
Preservation in record: Plaintiff did not preserve this issue. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Should the judgment be affirmed on the alternative basis that the 
trial court erred and/or abused its discretion when allowing plaintiff to "substitute" 
Gregory Bamett for her previously undisclosed (or at best, improperly disclosed) expert 
witness, Dru Dickson, in responding to the motions for summary judgment? 
Standard of review: "Whether a trial court has erred in granting or denying a 
motion to designate a substitute expert is a legal question, which we review for 
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correctness; however, we afford a trial court very broad discretion in ruling on such a 
motion." Boice v. Marble. 982 P.2d 565, 568 (Utah 1999). 
Preservation in record: The impropriety of plaintiffs attempt to "substitute" 
Barnett for Dickson was presented in numerous pleadings (R. 245-248, 919-973, 985-
988, 1073-1074, 1094-1114, 1120-1131, 1144-1219, 1251-1257, 1261-1264, 1269-1298, 
1397-1398) and at the hearing on the original motions for summary judgment. (R. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case does not focus on any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is a products liability case for personal injury allegedly received when the 
airbag in an automobile (the "Duster") deployed for no apparent reason while plaintiff 
was driving at low speed in a parking lot. (R. 1-3, 72-74). With plaintiffs permission, 
defendants' expert witness (Michael Cassidy) inspected the Duster, removed various 
components from the airbag system for testing and determined that they were free from 
defects. (R. 462-463 at fflf 19-21; 1641-1643). Plaintiffs counsel was given the results 
of these tests shortly after they were obtained. (R. 144). 
In her designation of over tiiirty expert witnesses plaintiff listed a person named 
"Dru Dickson" without indicating his qualifications or area of testimony. (R. 245-248). 
Although defendants asked plaintiff to provide more information concerning her expert 
witnesses, she never did. (R. 480 at ^ 10; 933, 937-939). After defendants moved for 
summary judgment, plaintiff first sought time to respond, arguing that her expert witness 
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had disappeared, then filed responses supported by an affidavit from her newly-
designated "supplemental" expert, Gregory Bamett. (R. 441-794, 808-920, 985-999, 
1024-1093). Defendants moved to strike the supplemental designation, and plaintiff filed 
a motion to "substitute" Bamett for Dickson. (R. 1094-1114, 1120-1140, 1144-1145, 
1147-1264, 1269-1364). The court agreed that plaintiff had not properly disclosed 
Dickson; reluctantly allowed plaintiff to substitute Bamett; and denied the motions for 
summary judgment without prejudice, pending Bamett's deposition. (R. 1573 at 16:16-
17:20; 20:20-23:1; 33:18-37:14; 1364). 
After deposing Bamett and learning he had no factual basis for the opinions stated 
in his affidavit, defendants filed renewed motions for summary judgment. (R. 1393-
1566, 1624-1923). In supporting affidavits, Cassidy explained how he had tested the 
airbag sensors and determined they were free from defects. (R. 1421-1433, 1549-1559, 
1641-1648). Finding that Barnett's conclusory assertions failed to contradict Cassidy's 
detailed analysis, the court determined it was uncontradicted that the airbag sensors were 
free from defects and entered summary judgment. (R. 1981-1984, 1999 at 43:14-45:8). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS 
Plaintiff admitted all of the following facts either in pleadings filed in the trial 
court or in the Brief of Appellant (hereafter the "Appellant's Brief) filed on appeal. 
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A. The Duster 
In April 1993, DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("DCC") manufactured a Plymouth 
Duster automobile, bearing vehicle identification number 3P3XP6439PT598491 
(hereafter the "Duster"). (R. 1398 at If 1; 1587 at f 1). The Duster contains seatbelts for 
the driver and all passengers, in addition to an airbag system designed to protect the 
driver in frontal collisions. (R. 1399 at f^ 5; 1587 at f^ 5). The driver's airbag system 
includes two front impact sensors, the airbag module and the airbag system diagnostic 
module ("ASDM"), which also houses the "safing sensor". (R. 1399 at 1 7; 1587 at | 7). 
The ASDM "monitors critical input and output circuits within [the] air bag system, 
ensuring they are operating correctly." (R. 1611 at left). The safing sensor is "an integral 
sensor in [the] circuitry of [the] system, which is used to fire [the] air bag module." (Id.). 
The airbag module is mounted in the steering wheel. (R. 1399 at f 6; 1587 at | 6). 
Electrical power from the battery and electronic information from the ASDM and 
sensors are delivered to the airbag through insulated copper wires which are embedded in 
a "wiring harness" and which run from the dashboard of the Duster, inside the steering 
column, through a device called a "clockspring" and into the steering wheel. (R. 1399 at 
If 8; 1587 at If 8).1 The "clockspring" is a rotary device located between the steering 
wheel and the steering column which facilitates the transmission of electric energy from 
the stationary steering column of the Duster to the moveable steering wheel. (R. 1399 at 
U 9; 1587 at ]f 9). Coils of flat wire inside the clockspring uncoil and re-coil as the 
1
 A diagram showing the relation of the steering wheel to the clockspring and airbag 
module is submitted in the Addendum at Tab 5. 
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steering wheel is turned and released. (R. 1399 at ^ 9; 1587 at f 9). There is sufficient 
flat wire inside the clockspring to permit the steering wheel to turn approximately one 
and one-half revolutions without damaging these wires. (R. 1399 at Tf 9; 1587 at ^ 9). 
The "steering column" connects the steering wheel to the body of the Duster. (R. 
1399 at | 10; 1587 at 1} 10). In particular, the steering column connects with the "steering 
rack and pinion" (hereafter the "steering rack") mounted to a beam under the engine 
compartment of the Duster. (R. 1399 at | 10; 1587 at f 10). A point of attachment 
between the steering column and the steering rack is a universal joint called the "upper 
steering coupler". (R. 1400 at f^ 10; 1587 at J^ 10). The upper steering coupler is visible 
inside the passenger compartment of the Duster, just above the floor and immediately 
behind the brake pedal. (R. 1400 at If 11; 1587 at f 11). The design of the Duster allows 
sufficient clearance between the brake pedal and upper steering coupler so that the brake 
pedal does not contact the upper steering coupler. (R. 1400 at Tf 11; 1587 at f 11). In the 
Duster as built, the brake pedal may be depressed to its full extent without contacting the 
upper steering coupler. (R. 1400 at If 11; 1587 at f 11). 
DCC maintains a system of quality control which requires the inspection of every 
vehicle as it rolls off the assembly line. (R. 1398 at | 2; 1587 at 1f 2). This system for 
maintaining quality control was in place and operational at DCC for many years before 
April 1993 and continued thereafter. (R. 1398 at f 3; 1587 at f 3). The Duster was 
inspected as part of the DCC quality control system in place in April 1993. (R. 1399 at f 
A diagram showing the relation of the steering wheel to the steering column and 
upper steering coupler is submitted in the Addendum at Tab 6. 
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4; 1587 at If 4). These inspections included examining the brake pedal and upper steering 
coupler and depressing the brake pedal to its full extent. (R. 1400 at | 12; 1587 at f 12). 
If the Duster's brake pedal had contacted the upper steering coupler, either with the brake 
released or the pedal fully depressed, the Duster would not have passed these inspections. 
(Appellant's Brief at pp.13, 25). 
The Duster at issue was first sold to a consumer on July 28, 1993. (R. 1400 at f 
14; 1587 at Tj 14). Two years later, Jody and Ron Best purchased the Duster as a "used" 
vehicle in May of 1995. (R. 1401 at | 16; 1587 at H 16). At that time, the Duster had 
been driven approximately 16,700 miles. (R. 1401 at 117; 1587 at Tf 17). 
B. Accidents and Repair History 
On September 13, 1996, as plaintiff Jody Best was driving the Duster, a vehicle 
traveling at about 65 miles per hour "slammed into" the front left section of the Duster 
with sufficient force to drag the Duster across four lanes of traffic, (hereafter the "1996 
Accident"). (R. 1401 at fflf 18-23; 1588 at 1fl[ 18-23). Due to the force and direction of 
impact in the 1996 Accident, the airbag of the Duster properly deployed. (R. 1402 at ^ 
24; 1588 at U 24). The Duster was "badly damaged" on the front end, particularly to the 
driver's side (left side). (R. 1402 at 125; 1588 at | 25). 
The Best's insurer considered the Duster a total loss, but the Bests insisted the 
Duster be repaired. (R. 1402 at ffl[ 26-30; 1588 at fflf 26-30). Dan Worth d/b/a Worth's 
Custom Body and Paint ("Worth") performed the repairs, including the replacement of 
airbag components. (R. 1403 at tlf 31 and 35; 1588 at ^ 31 and 35; 1710 at 12; 1925 at 
If 2). All parts used by Worth to repair the Duster, including the airbag system, were 
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purchased from Larry H. Miller Chrysler Jeep ("Miller"). (R. 1710 at f 3; 1925 at t 3). 
After Worth completed the repairs to the Duster from the 1996 Accident, the Duster was 
returned to the Bests. (R. 1403 at f 36; 1588 at If 36). 
On July 16, 1997, another automobile "slammed into the left ... side" of the 
Duster (hereafter the "1997 Accident"). (R. 1403 at If 37; 1588 at ^ 37). In the 1997 
Accident, the other vehicle was traveling about 40 miles per hour when the driver "lost 
control"; the vehicle "spun around 180 degrees" and hit the Duster. (R. 1404 at ^ 38; 
1588 at If 38). The airbag of the Duster did not deploy in the 1997 Accident3. (R. 449 at 
If 39; 1026 at T| 39; see also 1404 at H 39; 1589 at f 39). 
The Duster suffered damage to the left fender, left door (driver's door), right 
fender, bumper and possibly the frame in the 1997 Accident. (R. 1404 at | 40; 1589 at 1f 
40). Worth repaired this damage as well. (R. 1404 at 141; 1589 at f 41). Following the 
repairs from the 1997 Accident, the Duster was returned to Jody Best and appeared to 
perform satisfactorily. (R. 1404 at 142; 1589 at 1f 42). 
On September 21, 1999, plaintiff was driving the Duster in the parking lot of a 
shopping center when the airbag deployed for no apparent reason, striking plaintiff and 
allegedly causing her injury. (R. 1404 at f 44; 1589 at 144). By that time the Duster had 
been driven approximately 67,000 miles. (R. 1406 at If 52; 1591 at f 52). 
This was a side collision, not a frontal collision. (See R. 1026 at fflf 37 and 40.) 
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II. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
A. Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosures 
On May 19, 2000, before this lawsuit was filed, counsel for DCC requested 
assurances from plaintiffs counsel that the Duster would be "preserved and maintained 
without destruction or alteration of any kind." (R. 141). Seven months later, on 
December 19, 2000, plaintiff filed her complaint against DCC. (R. 1-3). 
On July 17, 2002, DCC requested plaintiff to identify everyone "who has 
inspected, tested, evaluated or repaired" the Duster's steering mechanism, and to identify 
her expert witnesses on liability issues, including a brief summary of the relevant 
information possessed by each expert. (R. 116-126 at fflf 10.e and 12). Plaintiff having 
not answered these interrogatories by August 26, 2002, counsel for DCC wrote to 
plaintiffs counsel requesting immediate responses. (R. 112 at ^} 3-5 and 139). 
On August 7, 2002, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Miller and Worth 
as defendants. (R. 72-74). At a scheduling meeting pursuant to Rule 26(f), U.R.C.P., 
held on September 23, 2002, the parties agreed that plaintiff would designate her expert 
witnesses and have them ready for deposition by April 7, 2003. (R. 192-193 at lj 1; 194 at 
f^ 3(e); and 197). In October of 2002, plaintiffs counsel agreed with Miller's counsel that 
plaintiff would not disassemble the Duster absent prior notice to the defendants and 
permission to observe. (R. 1998 at 18:16-23). 
Plaintiff having not responded to DCC's interrogatories by December 13, 2002, 
DCC filed a motion to compel (R. 111-147). On January 9, 2003, the court granted the 
motion to compel, ordering plaintiff to answer the discovery by January 3], 2003. (R. at 
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151-152). On February 12, 2003, almost six months after they were due, plaintiff 
responded to DCC's discovery requests. (R. 215 at f 19; 477-492). With respect to the 
question about expert witnesses, although plaintiff admitted using the services of an 
expert, she did not disclose his name. (R. 480 at | 10). These discovery responses were 
never supplemented. (R. 1282 at 11). 
On March 4, 2003, the court signed the Case Management Order submitted by the 
parties. (R. 197-199). As agreed, plaintiff was to designate her expert witnesses and 
have them ready for deposition by April 7, 2003. (R. 198 at f 5). On March 7, 2003, 
plaintiff filed a motion to extend the various deadlines in the Case Management Order by 
ninety days. (R. 201-205). All three defendants opposed the motion, pointing out 
plaintiffs repeated failures to respond to discovery requests. (R. 212-233). 
On April 7, 2003, plaintiff filed a "Designation of Expert Witnesses" in which she 
listed four police officers, nineteen doctors, five hospitals, unidentified "experts from the 
National Highway Safety Transportation Board", unidentified "experts from the N. H. T. 
S. A., Office of Defects Investigation", and a person named Dru Dickson. (R. 245-248). 
Plaintiff did not identify the subject area on which any of these purported experts were 
expected to testify, the basis for their opinions, or their qualifications. (Id.). Plaintiffs 
entire description of Dru Dickson consisted of the following: "Dru Dickson, Sandy Utah, 
577-9421." (R. 248 at 130). 
On May 16, 2003, the court ruled on plaintiffs motion to extend the deadlines in 
the Case Management Order by ninety days. (R. 348-349). Noting that the case had 
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already suffered "significant delays," the court nonetheless extended the deadlines in the 
case management order by sixty days. (R. 349). 
After Miller and Worth were added as defendants, defense counsel arranged for a 
second inspection of the Duster to occur in late July 2003. (R. 815 at If 16; 902 at Tj 5; 
929-933). Cassidy planned to participate in this inspection. (R. 933). However, before 
this inspection could take place, plaintiffs counsel informed counsel for Worth that the 
Duster had been disassembled and inspected at his request, in derogation of preservation 
agreements with defense counsel. (R. 901-902, see f 6). This unidentified person 
disassembled the dashboard and removed the clockspring from the steering column (R. 
991-990, see fflf 6-7; 1067-1069, see ffl[ 14-15; 1893-1895, see fflf 6, 7), thereby damaging 
the clockspring to such an extent that further testing of it was useless. (R. 897-898 at ^} 
7-12; 1888-1889 at fflf 2-3). On July 9, 2003, counsel for DCC asked plaintiffs counsel 
to identify the person who disassembled the Duster and to supplement plaintiffs response 
to the interrogatory about expert witnesses. (R. 1335). In July and August of 2003, 
counsel for Worth also asked plaintiffs counsel to identify the person who did this. (R. 
1338-1339, 1341). 
Pursuant to the Case Management Order as amended, the time to designate expert 
witnesses expired on June 6, 2003. (R. 198 at Tj 5; 349). Plaintiff never supplemented 
her designation of expert witnesses nor responded to any of the inquiries about who 
disassembled the Duster. (R. 1281-1285 at Iflf 1, 3-5). 
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B. The Original Motions for Summary Judgment. 
In early September 2003, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary 
judgments, based in large measure on plaintiffs failure to designate an expert witness to 
testify regarding liability issues. (R. 441-795, 808-918). On September 16, 2003, plaintiff 
asked the court for an "open-ended" extension of time to respond to these motions, 
asserting that her expert witness had moved and was no longer available. (R. 919). 
Defendants opposed this request, pointing out that plaintiff failed to disclose the identity 
of her liability experts or the person who disassembled the Duster. (R. 921-973). 
On October 22, 2003, the court granted plaintiff ten days to respond to the motions 
for summary judgment. (R. 985-987). In its order, the court noted: 
While all three of the defendants have filed separate oppositions or 
objections to plaintiffs Motion for Enlargement of Time, they all speak to 
the protracted nature of this case, the plaintiffs prior repeated requests for 
extensions of time and the fact that this matter has been delayed principally 
because of the plaintiffs failure to respond to discovery and otherwise 
prosecute her case. 
This time, the plaintiff has not replied to the defendants' oppositions, 
leaving uncontroverted their assertions concerning her repeated failure to 
move this matter forward. 
As the defendants point out, the plaintiff has never identified an expert 
witness and the time for doing so has now expired. 
(R. 985-986 and n.2). 
Eight days later, on October 30, 2003, plaintiff retained Gregory Barnett as an 
expert witness. (R. 1047 at | 1). On November 1, 2003, Bamett signed an affidavit 
stating his opinions about alleged defects in the Duster's airbag system. (R. 1047-1052). 
On November 3, 2003, plaintiff submitted her responses to the defendants' motions for 
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summary judgment, supported largely by the Barnett affidavit. (R. 1024-1072, 1081-
1093). On the same day, plaintiff submitted a "Supplemental Designation of Expert 
Witnesses" in which she provided the name, address, telephone number, area of 
testimony and background qualifications for Bamett. (R. 1073-1080). 
Defendants Miller and Worth moved to strike the "supplemental designation" and 
Bamett's affidavit. (R. 1120-1131, 1144-1215, 1251-1264, 1269-1271). In its reply 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, DCC argued that Bamett's 
affidavit was not admissible because he had not been timely disclosed. (R. 1094-1114). 
In response to these arguments, plaintiff explained that Bamett was merely a "substitute" 
for Dickson and was "merely the same witness with a new name." (R. 1233).4 On 
December 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Substitute Expert Witness" in which she 
asked the court for permission to substitute Bamett for Dickson. (R. 1272-1276). All 
defendants opposed plaintiff s motion to substitute. (R. 1281-1347, 1354-1360). 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs motion to substitute 
Bamett for Dickson and defendants' motions to strike Bamett's affidavit came on for 
hearing on April 5, 2004. (R. 1361-1362, 1998). During that hearing, when queried by 
the court as to "who tore this thing apart?" plaintiffs counsel explained that Dickson 
disassembled the Duster's dashboard and steering column at his request. (R. 1998 at 
4
 In support of her position, plaintiff argued that DCC had three times designated a 
supplemental expert witness after the deadline for naming experts. (R. 1231-1232). In 
fact, DCC had never designated a previously undisclosed expert witness after the 
deadline for doing so; it had only cross-designated one expert witness previously 
disclosed by Worth. (R. 1236-1238). 
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13:9-18). The court then noted that Dickson had not been properly disclosed; that 
Dickson "could have been an expert on anything" and that he "could have been there to 
testify about the color of the road for all we know". (Id. at 16:20-21:7). Plaintiffs 
counsel agreed with these observations. (Id. at 17:1-19). 
The court found these failures sufficient reason to deny plaintiffs motion to 
substitute. (Id. at 21:14-16). Nonetheless, the court believed that if he denied the motion 
his ruling could be overturned on appeal. (Id. at 21:16-22). Therefore, the court 
reluctantly granted the motion to substitute, even though he found "the way [plaintiffs 
counsel] handled this [to be] extremely poor". (Id. at 22:2-4). 
The court made clear, however, that the order granting substitution was not a 
license for Barnett to conduct further analysis, perform more testing or develop new 
opinions. (Id. at 34:13-36:22). Defendants could depose Bamett and explore the basis 
for his opinions, but Bamett would be restricted to the opinions previously formed and 
stated in his affidavit. (Id. at 35:19-21). The court warned plaintiffs counsel that Bamett 
"is going to have to base his conclusions in his affidavit on what he knew at the time he 
made them" and that if Bamett's opinions "aren't based on anything, I expect to hear this 
matter again". (Id. at 34:14-16; 35:19-22; 36:19-21). Plaintiffs counsel made no 
objection or response to these comments and never said that Bamett needed to conduct 
additional testing. (See id. at 34:11-37:16). 
The court then denied the bulk of the motions for summary judgment without 
prejudice, allowing defendants to depose Bamett. (Id. at 33:12-16; 34:13-16; 36:12-
37:14). The court did, however, enter an order of partial summary judgment in favor of 
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Miller, dismissing all claims for negligent repair against Miller. (R. 1365-1366). 
Plaintiff has not appealed that order. 
C. The Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment 
The defendants deposed Barnett on May 20, 2004. (R. 1540). At this deposition, 
defendants learned that when Barnett signed his affidavit on November 3, 2003, he had 
not inspected the Duster and did not know how many accidents the Duster had been 
involved in, the nature of the damage suffered in those accidents, nor what repairs had 
been performed to correct that damage. (R. 1406 at fflf 53 and 54; 1591 at fflf 53 and 54; 
1712-1713 at 1fij 16-22; 1926 at fflf 16-22). The sole basis for Barnett's opinions were 
photographs of the Duster and a video tape of a diagnostic examination of the Duster's 
airbag system. (R. 1713 at f 23; 1926 at f 23). 
Defendants filed renewed motions for summary judgment in late 2004. (R. 1393-
1566, 1703-1922)5. Plaintiff filed responses supported by a supplemental affidavit from 
Barnett in which he contradicted statements made in his deposition. (R. 1574-1612, 
1924-1939). DCC and Miller filed a reply memorandum supported by a third affidavit 
from their expert witness, Michael Cassidy. (R. 1624-1700). 
On January 24, 2005, the court held a hearing on the renewed motions for 
summary judgment. (R. 1999). At this hearing, although plaintiffs counsel moved to 
strike Cassidy's third affidavit on the ground that it was unfair for DCC and Miller to 
submit an affidavit with their reply memorandum, he never told the court that his expert 
5
 At this point, DCC and Miller were represented by the same counsel and filed a 
combined motion. 
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(Barnett) needed to perform additional testing. (R. 1999 at 13:21 - 14:12). Rather, 
plaintiffs counsel repeatedly asserted that Barnett could conclusively determine the 
Duster's airbag system was defective simply by looking at pictures of a computer read-
out. (Id. at 16:8 - 19:4; 20:5-19; 25:8 - 26:9; 27:20 - 28:5). The court found this 
assertion unconvincing in light of the uncontradicted evidence that Cassidy had examined 
and tested the various components of the airbag system and found the sensors and ASDM 
to be free from defects. (Id. at 26:10 - 25; 28:25 - 30:18). 
The court also pressed plaintiffs counsel for evidence that the repairs performed 
by Worth were performed in a negligent manner, and concluded that he had none. (Id. at 
37:9 - 39:14). The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Worth on the 
ground that plaintiff had no evidence that the repairs performed by Worth were 
performed in a negligent manner. (Id. at 41:22 - 43:13; R. 1964-1965). 
With respect to the renewed motion for summary judgment filed by DCC and 
Miller, the court found the evidence to be uncontradicted that the sensors in the airbag 
system were tested and determined to be free from defects. (R. 1999 at 44:15 - 45:8). 
The court therefore granted summary judgment for DCC and Miller on plaintiffs claims 
for strict liability and negligence. (Id.; R. 1981-1983). Plaintiff appealed from both 
summary judgment orders, but dismissed her appeal from the order concerning Worth 
before the briefing commenced. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants' expert witness (Cassidy) examined the Duster; tested the electrical 
circuits in the airbag system; conducted a fault code scan of this system; removed the 
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front sensors and ASDM for testing; and determined they were free from defects. 
Plaintiffs expert witness (Barnett) did not examine the Duster or test any of its 
components. His opinions are based on pictures of the fault code scan conducted by 
Cassidy or another examiner. Barnett's conclusory opinions fail to raise a genuine issue 
of fact because the fault code scan is only the first step in the analysis, as Barnett admits. 
The fault code scan indicates only that there is a fault somewhere in the electrical circuit, 
as Barnett admits. To determine the exact location of that fault the components of the 
circuit must be tested, as Barnett admits. Barnett, however, did not conduct such testing. 
Faced with the results of Cassidy's complete analysis and Barnett's admittedly 
incomplete review, the court properly found it was uncontradicted the front sensors and 
ASDM were free from defects. 
Cassidy's analysis also determined that the short circuits which caused the airbag 
to deploy were the result of replacing the steering rack with an improper part in early 
1999. Barnett's testimony fails to address this aspect of Cassidy's opinions. Thus, it is 
uncontradicted that the short circuits which caused the airbag to deploy were the result of 
modifications to the Duster for which defendants were not responsible. 
Plaintiff never challenged the admissibility of Cassidy's opinions on evidentiary 
grounds. The record also demonstrates that Cassidy is an airbag systems engineer and 
was well qualified to render opinions concerning the Duster's airbag system. 
The court should not have allowed plaintiff to "substitute" Barnett for Dickson. 
Plaintiff never properly designated Dickson. Plaintiff ignored all requests from 
defendants to identify her liability expert witnesses and the person who disassembled the 
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Duster contrary to agreement of counsel. Plaintiff having engaged in dilatory and 
obstructionist tactics which frustrated the progress of this case at every stage, the court 
abused its discretion when allowing plaintiff to "substitute" Barnett for Dickson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
To recover from DCC on her claim for product liability, plaintiff must show that 
the Duster contained a defect when it was first sold in 1993. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6; 
Lamb v. B&B Amusements. Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993); Bishop v. Gen Tec, 
Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 225-226 (Utah 2002). If plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the 
Duster contained a defect when it was first sold, her claim against DCC must fail. 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App. 1993). To recover 
from Miller plaintiff must show that the components of the airbag system sold to and 
installed by Worth following the 1996 Accident were defective when Miller sold those 
components to Worth. No admissible evidence indicates that the Duster contained a 
defect when sold by DCC in 1993 or that the replacement components of the airbag 
system were defective when sold by Miller in 1996. Therefore, the trial court properly 
entered summary judgment. 
A. There Is No Factual Dispute That All Components of the Duster's Airbag 
System Except the Damaged Clockspring Were Free From Defects. 
The only evidence which plaintiff offered to demonstrate the existence of a defect 
in the Duster's airbag system was the conclusory testimony of her expert, Barnett. 
However, as will be demonstrated below, Barnett's conclusory statements fail to raise a 
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genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a defect in the airbag system 
when the Duster was built or when the replacement parts were sold. 
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant's 
opinions and conclusions. Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1171 (Utah 1983). Rather, 
affidavits must enumerate specific evidentiary facts which support the conclusions 
presented. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). Conclusory affidavits 
lacking factual support do not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Brown v. Wanlass, 
18 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Utah 2001); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983); 
Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723. 725 (Utah 1985). 
The same rules apply, perhaps with greater force, to affidavits submitted by expert 
witnesses. Gaw v. Utah, 798 P.2d 1130. 1137, n. 10 (Utah App. 1990); Butterfield supra; 
831 P.2d at 102-104. Thus, the opinions stated in an affidavit submitted by an expert 
witness must rest upon specific facts that logically support that opinion. Butterfield, 
supra, 831 P.2d at 104; American Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 274 
(Utah App. 1988). The bare assertion that an expert has reviewed certain facts and bases 
his opinion on them will not suffice. Butterfield, supra, 831 P.2d at 104. 
In addition, expert testimony must reveal a "logical nexus" between the facts in 
evidence and the expert's opinions. Patev v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah 1999); 
Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 
1984). Even when considering a motion for summary judgment, a court is not compelled 
to accept a factual assertion in an affidavit which is demonstrably false. United States v. 
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Various Slot Machines, 658 F.2d 697, 701 (9m Cir. 1981), cited with approval in 
Butterfield supra, 831 P.2d at 103. 
1- Cassidy's Detailed Analysis of the Duster and Its Airbag System Revealed 
That All Components Except the Damaged Clockspring Were Free From 
Defects. 
The expert witness retained by DCC, Michael Cassidy, inspected the Duster on 
March 9, 2001. (R. 462 at Tf 19; 1424 at | 19; 1641 at f 2). Plaintiffs attorney was 
present during this inspection. (R. 462 at Tf 19; 1424 at f 19). Using his diagnostic 
equipment and skills as an airbag systems engineer, Cassidy performed an electronic 
analysis of the various components of the airbag system. (R. 463 at f^ 21; 1425 at Tf 21). 
As the first step in this electronic analysis, Cassidy conducted a "fault code scan" by 
connecting a "Diagnostic Readout Box" ("DRB") to the Duster's ASDM (airbag system 
diagnostic module). (R. 1550 at f| 3-4). The DRB indicated "front sensor short" and 
"safmg sensor short." (R. 1048-1049 atf 12; 1534-1535 at 112). 
The "front sensor short" message on the DRB means that there is a short circuit 
somewhere in the electrical circuit that encompasses the front sensor, clockspring and 
related wiring. (R. 1552 at ^ 7). Similarly, the fault message "safmg sensor short" means 
there is a short circuit somewhere in the electrical circuit that encompasses the safmg 
sensor, clockspring and related wiring. (R. 1643 at 1f 8; 1552 at ^ 7). To determine the 
specific location of the short circuits giving rise to these fault code messages, these 
electrical circuits must be physically inspected. (R. 1643 at If 8; 1552-1553 at | 7-8). 
Cassidy did this by disconnecting a wire at the base of the steering column, bypassing the 
clockspring, and attaching a testing device designed to simulate the electronic resistance 
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of the airbag. (R. 1552 at f 7). Prior to bypassing the clockspring, the airbag warning 
lamp in the instrument cluster on the dashboard was illuminated. (Id.). After bypassing 
the clockspring, the airbag warning lamp was no longer illuminated, indicating the 
system no longer had short circuits. (Id.). This led Cassidy to conclude, by process of 
elimination, that both of the short circuits discovered in the fault code scan of the ASDM 
occurred in the clockspring, because eliminating the clockspring from the system ''fixed" 
these short circuits. (Id.). 
With the permission of plaintiff s counsel, Cassidy also removed the left and right 
front sensors and ASDM for laboratory analysis. (R. 1641-1642 at Tj 2). Cassidy then 
took these components to the facilities of TRW, Inc., in Detroit for electronic testing. (R. 
1642 at Tj 3). TRW manufactured these specific components for the Duster's airbag 
system and has the equipment for testing these components as they come off the 
assembly line. (Id. at ^ 4). The purpose of this testing is to ensure that the sensors (and 
other components) meet specifications and function properly. (Id. at | 5). 
At Cassidy's request and under his supervision, technicians at TRW tested the left 
front sensor, right front sensor and ASDM using the same type of test conducted on new 
sensors as they come off the assembly line. (R. 1642-1643 at f| 5-6). Each component 
performed within specifications and functioned properly. (Id.). No short circuits or other 
faults were discovered in the front sensors or the ASDM. (Id. at If 6). In addition, 
because the safmg sensor is located within the ASDM, the results of this electronic 
analysis necessarily demonstrated that the safing sensor was also free of short circuits or 
other faults. (Id.). On May 10, 2001, counsel for DCC provided to plaintiffs counsel the 
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results of TRW's analysis of these components. (R. 1441). Based on his electronic 
analyses of the Duster's airbag system, Cassidy concluded that the "airbag system crash 
sensors were in place . . . and operational." (R. 463 at ^ 21; 1425 at 1f 21). 
During his March 9, 2001 inspection, Cassidy also looked closely at the steering 
rack underneath the Duster. (R. 462 at lj 20; 1424 at ^ 20; 1553 at f 9). This component 
was not the original equipment supplied by DCC but an after-market part. (R. 462 at ^ 
20; 1424 at f 20; 1553 at f 9). It was also the incorrect part for the Duster and did not fit 
properly, causing the steering column to be misaligned and the upper steering coupler to 
contact the brake pedal when turning the steering wheel. (R. 463 at fflf 22-23; 1425 at fflf 
22-23; 1553 at f^ 9). The steering rack was still in new condition whereas the remainder 
of the components on the underside of the Duster were rusted and showed extensive wear 
and weathering. (R. 1553 at f 9). From this, Cassidy concluded that the steering rack 
was recently installed on the Duster, probably within the last six months before the airbag 
inadvertently deployed in September of 1999. (Id.).6 
Cassidy also inspected the area inside the passenger compartment of the Duster, 
near the brake pedal where the driver's feet rest. (R. 463-464 at 122-23; 1425-1426 at fflf 
22-23; 1553 at f^ 9). He could clearly see that the upper steering coupler contacted the 
brake pedal. (R. 463 at ^ 23; 1425 at ^ 23). In the Duster as manufactured in 1993, the 
upper steering coupler would not have contacted the brake pedal. (R. 463 at If 23; 1425 at 
If 23 ). If the upper steering coupler had contacted the brake pedal when the Duster rolled 
Plaintiff submitted no factual material to contradict this. (See Section 1.4 below). 
7
 Plaintiff admitted this fact. (R. 1400 at 111; 15 87 at \ 11) 
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off the assembly line in April 1993, the Duster could not have passed the quality control 
inspection program then in place. (R. 463-464 at U 23; 1425-1426 at f 238). Cassidy also 
turned the steering wheel and found that it over-rotated (i.e., turned more than one and 
one-half revolutions). (R. 463 at f 22; 1425 at If 22; 1553 at If 9).9 
From his examination of the steering rack, upper steering coupler and steering 
wheel; his electronic analysis of the airbag sensors and the ASDM; and his wiring test of 
the airbag electrical circuits, Cassidy concluded that the installation of an improper 
steering rack caused a misalignment of the steering column, which in turn allowed for 
over-rotation of the steering wheel. (R. 463 at ]f 22; 1425 at f^ 22). The wires inside the 
clockspring were then damaged by repeated over-rotation of the steering wheel during 
normal use. (R. 463 at f^ 22; 1425 at f^ 22). The condition which allowed the steering 
wheel to over-rotate and damage the wires inside the clockspring did not exist in the 
Duster when it was first sold in 1993. (R. 463 at 122; 1425 at f 22). Nor did it have any 
relation to the replacement airbag components sold by Miller to Worth. (R. 1562 at If 6). 
2. Barnett's Conclusory Statements Fail to Raise a Genuine Factual Dispute. 
In opposition to Cassidy's detailed analysis of the Duster and its airbag system, 
plaintiff submitted the conclusory opinions of her expert, Barnett.10 Barnett did not 
examine the Duster, test any of its components, nor review its accident and repair history. 
(R. 1406 at Tflf 53, 54; 1591 at fflf 53, 54; 1712-1713 at ffif 16-22; 1926 at fflf 16-22). 
8
 Plaintiff admitted this fact as well. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 13, 15). 
9
 Plaintiff submitted no factual material to contradict this. (See Section 1.4 below). 
10
 In the trial court, defendants repeatedly pointed out the conclusory nature of 
Barnett's opinions. (R. 1100, 1127, 1136-1137, 1147-1148, 1191-1192, 1252, 1256). 
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Rather, Bamett's opinions are based entirely upon photographs of the results of a fault 
code scan conducted by "some young kid". (R. 1048-1050 at 1fl[ 11-15, 23; 1534-1536 at 
fh 11-15, 23; 1540 at 13:2-12; 22:24-23:2; 35:17 - 36:4; 1713 at | 23; 1926 at 1j 23; 
1595). The fault code scan indicated a short circuit in the front sensor and safmg sensor 
of the airbag system. (R. 1048-1049 at f 12; 1534-1535 at f 12). Plaintiff asserts that 
these read-outs "speak for themselves" and "conclusively establish" that "the airbag 
inappropriately deployed because of two defective parts": the front sensor and the safmg 
sensor. (R. 1594; 1999 at 27:5-13). 
Bamett5s conclusory statements regarding the front sensor lack a logical nexus to 
the facts. Bamett admits the read-outs from the fault code scan on the DRB are 
inconclusive and do not indicate exactly where in the front sensor circuit a short 
occurred. (R. 1540 at 29:13 - 30:9; 34:15 - 35:7; 36:5-12). Bamett further admits that in 
order to determine the exact location of a short circuit within the front sensor circuit, the 
various components of this circuit must be physically examined. (Id. at 30:9-13; 35:7-16; 
36:8-10). Bamett has not done this, however, as he never inspected the Duster. (Id. at 
10:4-15; 22:24-23:2). 
At his deposition, Bamett explained that when the DRB displays the fault message 
"front sensor short," this indicates a fault somewhere in the front sensor circuit, not 
necessarily in the front sensor itself: 
A: ' Okay. This is the proprietary scanner that dealers have at a Chrysler 
dealer. And it says, "1 of 1 codes, front sensor short." 
* * * 
Q: Now, what does that screen mean to you? 
* * * 
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A: Well, it's saying that you have - it's reading a fault in the front 
sensor circuit. 
Q: And what does that mean? 
A: Well, you have to understand that this device here - what it's 
looking at, resisted values throughout the circuit. If you have a short or 
something that's outside of its parameters, it doesn't necessarily mean that 
we have a bad sensor, but its something in that circuit. It's giving you a 
push in that direction. 
Q: So it could be a problem in the circuit as distinct from the 
component itself? 
A: Yes,. . . 
(R. 1540 at 29:10-30:9; emphasis added). In order to determine whether the fault was 
in the front sensor itself, rather than somewhere else in the front sensor circuit, Barnett 
admitted he would need to remove the front sensor and examine it: 
A: . . . I would suggest starting with the component itself and then 
checking the circuit after that. 
Q: And in order to do that, you'd have to take the device out of the 
vehicle and - and examine it; right? 
A: If you're meaning the front sensor, that's correct. 
Q: That is what I mean. 
(Id. at 30:9-13). Barnett, however, did not do this. (R. 1713 at If 22; 1928 at ^ 22). 
Again, at his deposition, Barnett explained that when the DRB displays the fault 
message "front sensor short," there could be a problem in the DRB or in the front sensor. 
In order to determine where the fault was occurring, Barnett admitted he would need to 
test the front sensors: 
Q: Okay. Now, you say the front sensor shorted out. Did you conclude 
from looking at the photographs how long the front sensor had shorted out 
before the airbag deployed? 
A: Now, we don't know that the front sensor is shorted. You can get a 
false reading from the computer and go out and test your front sensors, and 
they can test good. 
Q: So that's inconclusive, then? 
A: That's correct. 
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(R. 1540 at 36:5-12; emphasis added). However, Barnett has not conducted such a test. 
(Id. at 10:4-6; R. 1603 at ^ 7). 
The conclusion that the DRB read-outs identify faults in a circuit rather than faults 
in a component is supported by statements in the repair manual submitted by Barnett. 
This manual states: "Each circuit monitored by [the] ASDM has a corresponding fault 
code (message) assigned to it. For a description of fault codes, see DIAGNOSTIC 
FAULT CODES (MESSAGES)." (R. 1611, left side). Included among the fifteen 
possible fault codes are the messages "front sensor short" and "safing sensor short". (R. 
1612, right side). Thus, according to the repair manual submitted by Barnett, the DRB 
read-outs "front sensor short" and "safing sensor short" refer to faults in the front sensor 
and safing sensor circuits, not to faults in the sensors themselves. 
Barnett reaches his conclusion regarding the front sensors by taking only the first 
step in an analysis which he admits requires additional steps. In contrast to Barnett, 
Cassidy in fact removed the front sensors, tested them, and found that they were free 
from defects. Barnett's conclusory assertion, resting upon an admittedly incomplete 
analysis, does not contradict the results of Cassidy's complete analysis. 
In his supplemental affidavit submitted after his deposition, Barnett reversed his 
position and asserted that he need not inspect the Duster or the electrical circuits within 
the airbag system in order to determine exactly where the problem was located. (R. 
1575-1577 at fflf 7-9, 14, 18). Rather, Barnett concluded that the front sensor, safing 
sensor and/or ASDM were defective because the DRB read-outs said "front sensor short" 
and "safing sensor short," and no further testing was needed in light of these fault code 
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messages. (Id. at ^f 7-10, 14, 18). Barnett's change of position does not raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
A witness may not raise a factual issue by submitting an affidavit which 
contradicts his own deposition, absent an explanation for the discrepancy. Webster, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1172-1173; Gaw, supra, 798 P.2d at 1140. When a witness fails to 
provide an explanation for the contradiction between his deposition and his affidavit, the 
court should disregard the affidavit. Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 
401, 403 (Utah App. 1989); Harnicher v. University of Utah, 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 
1998); Brinton v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998). 
Barnett's attempt to explain the contradiction between his supplemental affidavit 
and his deposition by drawing a distinction between diagnosing a fault in an airbag 
system before the airbag has deployed and diagnosing a fault in the same system after the 
airbag has deployed is unavailing. (See R. 1577-1579 at fflf 19-22). In paragraph 20 of 
his supplemental affidavit, Barnett asserts that "If the system deployed, diagnostics are 
not performed as the part is automatically discarded." (R. 1606). This statement fails to 
raise an issue of fact because Barnett does not specify what "part" he is referring to: the 
sensors or the airbag. Of course, after an airbag has deployed, the airbag is discarded. 
Barnett then states: "However, if one wishes to see if one or both front sensors are good 
or bad, the part must be physically inspected." (Id.). This sentence is referring to the 
situation after "the system deployed" and contradicts the assertions that testing is not 
necessary. In Barnett's words (taken from paragraph 20 of his supplemental affidavit), 
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"If the system deployed" and "one wishes to see if one or both front sensors are good or 
bad," those sensors "must be physically inspected." 
Similarly, in paragraph 22 of his supplemental affidavit, Barnett admits that 
"computer modules can set false cods" [sic: "codes"]. (R. 1607). Because the fault code 
messages may be "false," further testing is necessary, as Barnett admitted in his 
deposition. Accordingly, the contradictory assertions in Bamett's supplemental affidavit 
fail to raise a genuine issue. 
Viewing the read-outs on the DRB, Barnett also concluded that there was no 
defect in the clockspring, because if the clockspring were defective the DRB (according 
to Barnett) would have so indicated. (R. 1049 at ^ 13, 15; 1535 at fflf 13, 15). This 
assertion rests upon the assumption that the DRB can indicate a short circuit in the 
clockspring. (R. 1059 at ffi[ 13, 15; 1535 at fflf 13, 15; 1540 at 25:3 - 26:3; 37:18 -
38:15). However, the DRB does not have this vocabulary. (R. 1551-1552 at f 6). In 
Cassidy's second affidavit submitted in support of the renewed motion for summary 
judgment, Cassidy explained that the DRB is not capable of displaying the message 
"clockspring" or "clockspring short." (Id.). In Bamett's second affidavit submitted in 
opposition to the renewed motion for summary judgment, Barnett did not contradict these 
statements by Cassidy. (R. 1602-1607). Thus, it is uncontradicted that the DRB is not 
capable of displaying the message "clockspring" or "clockspring short." That being the 
case, Bamett's conclusory opinion that the fault did not occur in the clockspring lacks a 
logical nexus to the facts and therefore fails to raise a genuine factual issue. 
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The determination that the DRB is not capable of displaying the message 
"clockspring" or "clockspring short," is supported by statements in the pages from the 
repair manual submitted by Barnett. At the top right corner of page 76, this manual states 
"For a description of fault codes, see DIAGNOSTIC FAULT CODES (MESSAGES)." 
(R. 1611). On the following page, under the heading "DIAGNOSTIC FAULT CODES 
(MESSAGES)," the manual lists a series of fault code messages. (R. 1612). Neither 
"clockspring" nor "clockspring short" is among them. 
In his supplemental affidavit, Barnett asserts that a fault-message of "safmg sensor 
short" on the DRB conclusively establishes a fault in the ASDM and not the 
clockspring.11 (R. 1604-1605 at ^ 9-11, 14). Bamett reaches this conclusion by reliance 
on a statement in a repair manual which indicates if the message "safing sensor short" 
appears, the ASDM should be replaced. (R. 1604-1605 at 1ffl 9, 15; 1612). n Barnett's 
conclusory reliance upon this statement lacks a logical nexus to the facts. 
The selected pages from the repair manual attached to Barnett's affidavit are 
incomplete and do not take the analysis to conclusion. (R. 1643 at 1f 9.a). The bottom 
right-hand corner of the third page Barnett submitted refers to "The following diagnostic 
Presumably this assertion is intended to support the conclusion that a short circuit 
occurred in the safing sensor, because the safing sensor is contained in the ASDM. 
12
 The manual referred to is not a DCC publication. (R. 1644 at ^ 9.a). As can be 
seen on the pages of this manual attached to Barnett's affidavit, various illustrations are 
reproduced "courtesy of Chrysler Corp." (R. 1610). If this manual were a publication of 
DCC or its predecessor, Chrysler Corporation, there would be no need to obtain 
permission from DCC or Chrysler to reproduce these illustrations. 
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charts and illustrations." (R. 1612). These "diagnostic charts and illustrations" are not 
attached to Barnett's affidavit. 
Moreover, the selected pages from the repair manual attached to Barnett's 
affidavit do not simply indicate that the ASDM should be replaced, and then stop. To the 
contrary, the second of the three pages submitted by Barnett explains that a "verification 
test" or "system operational check" should always be performed after a component is 
replaced "to ensure proper system operation": 
After component replacement, perform a system operational check to 
ensure proper system operation. See SYSTEM OPERATION CHECK13. 
* * * 
When using diagnostic charts, DO NOT skip any steps in chart or incorrect 
diagnosis may result. * * * Always perform TEST VER-1 -
VERIFICATION TEST after repairs are made. 
(R. 1611, emphasis in original). Thus, after inserting a new ASDM and/or front sensor, 
the mechanic would not stop, but would then perform a "verification test" or "system 
operation check" to determine if the fault had been corrected. The fact that such testing 
is required, after a component is replaced, indicates that merely replacing the component 
may not solve the problem, and, therefore, that the problem may not have been located in 
that component. Here, for example, if the ASDM had been replaced after the airbag icon 
illuminated and before the incident of September 1999, the problem would not have been 
solved. (R. 1644at!9.b). 
Thus, the fault code message "safing sensor short" does not necessarily mean that 
the fault lies in the safing sensor (or ASDM) and not in the clockspring. In contrast, 
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Cassidy's complete analysis demonstrated that the fault occurred in the clockspring and 
not the sensors. Barnett's conclusory reliance upon an incomplete passage from a repair 
manual therefore does not raise a genuine issue of fact. 
In his supplemental affidavit, Barnett asserts that "the clockspring is not part of the 
front sensor circuit and so running a wire around the clockspring will indicate nothing 
because it is the output portion of the circuit and not the input portion of the circuit." (R. 
1604 at 1 12). This assertion contradicts itself. If the clockspring is part of the "output 
portion of the circuit," then the clockspring is by definition part of the circuit. (R. 1646 at 
114). Certainly a party cannot create a factual issue by self-contradiction. 
Barnett asserts that the short circuits could not have occurred in the clockspring 
because if the clockspring had been defective, the short circuits "would have occurred 
immediately after the Plaintiff took possession of the subject vehicle in 1996," following 
repair of the damage from the 1996 Accident. (R. 1050 at 1 22). This conclusory 
assertion fails to address the nature of the problem in the clockspring. 
The condition inside the clockspring which led to the short circuits which in turn 
caused the airbag to deploy was created by the repeated over-rotation of the steering 
wheel during normal use after the improper steering rack was installed in 1999. (R. 463 
at 1 22; 1425 at 1 22; 1553 at 1 9). The clockspring would therefore not have short-
circuited immediately after the damage from the 1996 Accident was repaired, because the 
flat wires were incrementally damaged by repeated over-rotation of the steering wheel, 
13
 In fact, this message appears twice, once at the top left and again at the bottom left 
of page 76 of the repair manual. (R. 1611). 
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not catastrophically damaged in a single event. (R. 463 at f 22; 1425 at ^ 22; 1553 at ^ 
9). Moreover, the improper steering rack was not installed until 1999. (1553 at | 9). 
B. Plaintiffs Miscellaneous Arguments Fail to Raise a Genuine Factual Issue. 
Accepting Cassidy's observation that the steering column is misaligned, plaintiff 
asserts that DCC is nonetheless responsible for the resulting damage to the clockspring 
because the steering column and steering rack are both DCC parts. (Appellant's Brief at 
pp.15, 33, 35). This assertion is not supported by the record. Rather, plaintiff is 
attempting to create a factual issue by crisscrossing statements from Barnett and Cassidy 
which relate to different subjects. 
Cassidy stated - based on his inspection of the underside of the Duster - that the 
original steering rack had been replaced by an "after-market" part, some time in early 
1999. (R. 462-463 at lj 20; 1424 at 1 20; 1553 at ^ 9). Cassidy also noted that this 
replacement steering rack was the incorrect part for the Duster, causing the steering 
coupler to hit the brake pedal when the steering wheel was turned. (R. 463 at | 23; 1425 
at | 23; 1553 at f 9). Barnett did not dispute any of these observations. Rather, Barnett 
asserted that all of the parts used to repair the Duster after the 1996 Accident were 
official DCC parts. (R. 1049-1050 at ffif 18-19; 1535-1536 at fflf 18-19). 
Barnett's assertion does not contradict Cassidy's observation because the steering 
rack was not replaced as part of the repairs following the 1996 Accident but was replaced 
in early 1999. (R. 1553 at f 9). Moreover, the components used by Worth during the 
1996 repairs were purchased from Miller, and Miller never sold a steering rack to Worth. 
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(R. 1562-1563 at Tj 6). Thus, Cassidy's observation that the steering rack is not an 
official DCC part remains uncontradicted. 
Plaintiff concedes that the "steering column apparatus" is so badly misaligned that 
the Duster would not have passed DCC's quality control inspection program in 1993 in 
this condition. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 12-13, 25). Nonetheless, plaintiff asserts that the 
deployment of the airbag in September 1999 caused this misalignment and "apparently 
rearranged the entire column." (Appellant's Brief at pp.11-13). This assertion fails to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact for at least two reasons. First, plaintiff never made 
this assertion in the trial court, but offers it for the first time on appeal. Matters not 
presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). 
Second, there is absolutely no evidence that the misalignment of the steering 
column was caused by the deployment of the airbag. To overcome this gap, plaintiff 
erroneously asserts that "A simple review of the pictures shows that the car could not be 
driven at all because of the way the steering column was broken and down on the brake." 
(Appellant's Brief at p.25). The "pictures" do not support this assertion. Although the 
"pictures" show the steering coupler contacting the brake pedal, they do not show that 
"the car could not be driven". (See R. 1431-1433). 
Plaintiff asserts that the clockspring could not have caused the airbag to deploy 
because the clockspring is not the source of electrical energy or electrical signals but "is 
merely a conduit for the electrical signal to pass through." (Appellant's Brief at pp.7, 9, 
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10). It is true that the clockspring is not a source of electrical energy but is merely a 
conduit through which electrical energy and signals pass. (See R. 460 at If 11; 1422 at ^ 
11). However, it does not follow from these facts that damage to the wires inside the 
clockspring could not cause the airbag to deploy. 
To the contrary, electrical energy passes through wires inside the clockspring, 
from the battery to the airbag module in the steering wheel. (R. 460 at U 11; 1422 at ^ 
11). Plaintiff admitted this. (R. 1399 at | 8; 1587 at | 8). Since electrical energy passes 
through the clockspring from the battery to the airbag module, a short circuit in the 
clockspring could certainly cause the airbag to deploy. (R. 463 at ^ 22; 1425 at f^ 22). 
Plaintiff simply fails to understand how the clockspring operates. 
Relying on a statement in Bamett's affidavit, plaintiff asserts that the clockspring 
could not have been damaged because it is a "sealed unit." (Appellant's Brief at pp.24-
25). The record does not support this assertion. Bamett's statement relates to damage 
caused by "disassembling" the Duster. (R. 1050 at f^ 21; 1536 at 121). It has no bearing 
on damage caused by repeated over-rotation of the steering wheel during normal use. 
Plaintiff asserts that both Cassidy and Bamett "conducted the exact same test to 
determine how the airbag wrongfully deployed" and "were absolutely consistent in their 
methodology." (Appellant's Brief at pp.28-29). This assertion strays wide of the truth. 
Cassidy actually inspected the Duster; Bamett did not. Cassidy actually tested the 
various components of the Duster's airbag system; Bamett did not. Cassidy actually 
conducted a fault code scan, whereas Bamett merely looked at pictures of the scan 
conducted by Cassidy or another examiner. (R. 1550-1551 at f^ 4; 1595). 
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The only point in common between the methodology employed by Cassidy and 
that employed by Barnett is that both included a fault code scan (or at least pictures of the 
results of a fault code scan) as part of their analysis. Both experts looked at the same 
fault code readings; therefore both used the same starting point. (R. 1550-1551 at If 4). 
Barnett, however, looked only at the results of the fault code scan and then offered his 
opinions, even though he admits that further steps must be taken. In contrast, Cassidy 
conducted a fault code scan and then followed through with a complete analysis: he 
isolated the clockspring by means of a wiring test; he removed the sensors and ASDM for 
testing; and he carefully inspected both the interior and exterior of the Duster. Cassidy 
had a factual basis for his conclusions; Barnett did not. 
Plaintiff asserts that if the DRB cannot indicate a short circuit in the clockspring, 
then Cassidy could not determine that the fault occurred in the clockspring, because 
Cassidy relied upon the results of a fault code scan conducted with a DRB. (Appellant's 
Brief at p.23). Plaintiff forgets that in addition to conducting a fault code scan, Cassidy 
also tested the front sensors and ASDM and performed a wiring test of the steering 
column. Thus, Cassidy was able to pinpoint the location of the short circuits by 
conducting a more thorough analysis than simply reading the results of a fault code scan. 
C. It Is Uncontradicted that the Short Circuits Inside the Clockspring Which 
Allowed the Airbag to Deploy Were Caused by the Installation of an 
Improper Steering Rack. 
In her response to the renewed motion for summary judgment, plaintiff denied 
defendants' assertions that the steering rack on the Duster was replaced with an after-
market steering rack; that this after-market steering rack was not the proper part for the 
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Duster; that this improper replacement of the steering rack caused the steering column to 
be misaligned; that this misalignment of the steering column allowed the steering coupler 
to contact the brake pedal and allowed the steering wheel to over-rotate; that the over-
rotation of the steering wheel during normal use damaged the flat wires inside the 
clockspring; and that this damage to the wires inside the clockspring led to the short 
circuits which caused the airbag to deploy. (R. 1405-1406 at fflf 46-50; 1589-1591 at fflf 
46-50). Indeed, this is the only significant portion of the factual assertions made by DCC 
in its renewed motion for summary judgment which plaintiff did deny. (Compare R. 
1398-1406 at fflf 1-58 with 1587-1591 at ffif 1-58). These pro-forma denials do not raise a 
genuine factual issue, however. 
In attempted compliance with former Rule 4-501(2)(B), RJ.A. (now Rule 7(c), 
U.R.Civ.P.), plaintiff supported her denials of these factual assertions by reference to 
Barnett's original affidavit, supplemental affidavit, and deposition, and unspecified 
discovery responses. (See R. 1589-1591 at fflf 46-50). Plaintiff referenced the exact same 
material in regard to each factual assertion. (Id). However, plaintiff did not submit the 
unspecified discovery responses with her opposition. Thus, the entire basis for plaintiffs 
denials of these assertions in defendants' statement of material facts must be found in the 
referenced portions of Barnett's affidavits and deposition, or there is none. 
Space limitations preclude defendants from reviewing the referenced material in 
detail. Nonetheless, suffice it to say that nowhere in the referenced material does Bamett 
address the steering rack, steering column, steering wheel, or the subject of over-rotation. 
In this material, the only relevant points which Barnett attempts to make (in his 
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conclusory way) are that the short circuits could not have occurred in the clockspring 
because the DRB did not display a read-out which said "clockspring"; that the 
clockspring could not have been damaged during the disassembly of the Duster because it 
is a sealed unit; and that if the clockspring had been damaged during the repair of the 
Duster following the 1996 Accident, the airbag would have deployed before September 
of 1999. The underlying flaws in these assertions have already been demonstrated. 
Thus, it is uncontradicted that the steering rack is an after-market part and not the 
correct part for the Duster; that the installation of this improper steering rack caused a 
misalignment of the steering column (as evidenced by the steering coupler contacting the 
brake pedal); that this misalignment of the steering column allowed the steering wheel to 
be over-rotated; that the repeated over-rotation of the steering wheel during normal use 
damaged the flat wires inside the clockspring; and that this damage to the wires inside the 
clockspring led to the short circuits which caused the airbag to deploy. In fact, plaintiff 
now concedes that the steering column is out of alignment as evidenced by the steering 
coupler contacting the brake pedal. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 12-13, 25). 
D. The Court Properly Found It Was Uncontradicted That All Components of 
the Airbag System Except the Damaged Clockspring Were Free From 
Defects. 
Believing the court "ruled that the ASDM (on board computer) was defective 
instead of the sensors being defective," plaintiff argues that the court "was merely 
substituting one defective [DCC] part for another." (Appellant's Brief at p.l; see also pp. 
9 and 50). Before exposing the many flaws in this argument it is necessary to understand 
what the court actually ruled and why. 
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During the hearing on the renewed motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs 
counsel repeatedly asserted that Bamett could conclusively determine the existence of 
defects in the airbag system merely by looking at the fault code messages or "read-outs" 
from the ASDM displayed on the DRB. (R. 1999 at 16:20 - 18:19; 20:5-15; 21:12-15; 
25:8-12). Based on these read-outs, plaintiff argued to the trial court that defects in the 
front sensors caused the airbag to deploy. (Id. at 27:5-13). Counsel for DCC and Miller, 
however, explained that Cassidy actually removed these sensors, tested them and found 
them to be free from defects. (Id. at 4:11 - 5:3; 8:9-17; 22:1-18; 24:1-5). 
Faced with uncontradicted evidence that Cassidy actually tested the sensors and 
found them to be free from defects, the court was incredulous that plaintiff would rely 
solely on the computer read-outs from the fault code scan. (Id. at 16:21 - 25:13-24). 
Recognizing that computers are not infallible and that Cassidy had actually tested the 
sensors and found them to be free from defects, the court found it to be uncontradicted 
that the sensors were not defective. (Id. at 25:24 - 26:25; 27:5 - 29:12; 43:14 - 44:14). 
Exercising his "responsibility as a gatekeeper for expert witnesses," and noting that 
"there has to be some logical basis" for an expert's opinions, the court found Bamett's 
conclusory reliance on the fault code messages to be "pretty short sighted," because the 
computer could err. (Id. at 28:6 - 30:14). 
Plaintiff now argues that it was erroneous to enter summary judgment on this 
basis, because the computer is also a DCC part. This new argument must be rejected for 
at least three reasons. First, plaintiff asserted in the trial court that the computer was 
functioning properly and that the inadvertent deployment was caused by defects in the 
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front sensors. (Id. at 14:19 - 24; 21:7-9; 27:5-13). Plaintiff cannot now reverse her 
position and argue that a defect in the computer caused the deployment. Zions National 
Bank v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) 
(appellate court will not consider issues raised for first time on appeal). 
Second, plaintiffs argument confuses two computers: the airbag system diagnostic 
module built into the Duster and the digital read-out box which is a separate tool. If 
plaintiff is now arguing that the ASDM might be defective, this argument is refuted by 
the uncontradicted evidence that Cassidy also tested the ASDM and found that it was free 
from defects. (R. 1642-1643 at | 6). On the other hand, if plaintiff is now arguing that 
the DRB is defective, this argument is specious because the DRB could not possibly have 
caused plaintiffs injuries and plaintiff asserted no claim against anyone for a defect in 
the DRB. (SeeR.73atTH[lL 12). 
Third, even if actual tests of a physical component are not necessarily more 
reliable than a computer read-out, the judgment should nonetheless be affirmed. Alphin 
Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979) (correct result reached for incorrect 
reason will be affirmed). Although the fault code read-outs on the DRB may not have 
been erroneous, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that they were inconclusive and 
that further testing was necessary to determine the specific location of the fault. 
As Cassidy explained in his affidavits, the fault code message "front sensor short" 
means that there is a short somewhere in the electrical circuit encompassing the front 
sensors, clockspring and related wiring. (R. 1552 at Tf 7). As Barnett admitted in his 
deposition, the DRB is "looking at resisted values throughout the circuit"; therefore a 
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read-out of "front sensor short" on the DRB is "inconclusive" and "doesn't necessarily 
mean that we have a bad sensor, but it's something in that circuit." (R. 1540 at 29:10-
30:9; 36:5-12; emphasis added). As Bamett explained in his deposition, the fault code 
message "front sensor short" gives "you a push in that direction," but further testing is 
needed to determine exactly where the short circuit occurred. (Id. at 29:10-30:13; 
emphasis added). As Cassidy explained in his affidavit, in order to determine the specific 
location of an electrical short in the front sensor circuit, the various components of this 
circuit must be physically inspected. (R. 1552-1553 at ^f 7-8). As Bamett admitted in 
his deposition, in order to determine if the short was in the front sensors rather than 
somewhere else in the front sensor circuit, he would need to remove the front sensors and 
examine them. (R. 1540 at 30:9-13). Thus, the court correctly concluded that the 
computer read-outs must be followed by physical tests of the components at issue to 
determine the actual location of the short circuits. 
Cassidy did in fact test the individual components of the airbag's electrical 
circuits; Barnett did not. These tests showed that the front sensors, safing sensor and 
ASDM were free from defects. They also showed that the short circuits occurred inside 
the clockspring, as the result of damage to the flat wires caused by the installation of an 
improper steering rack. Plaintiff submitted no evidence to contradict any of these points. 
Therefore, the trial court properly found that the airbag system (aside from the damaged 
clockspring) was free from defects. In fact, plaintiff now admits that the sensors were 
"operational" (i.e., free from defects). (Appellant's Brief at p.17). 
39 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ACCEPTED CASSIDY'S AFFIDAVITS. 
Plaintiff expends nearly twenty pages arguing that the court should not have 
considered Cassidy's affidavits because they were inadmissible for various reasons. 
(Appellant's Brief at pp.3-21). This entire argument lacks merit. 
First, plaintiff having not challenged the admissibility of Cassidy's affidavits on 
evidentiary grounds (see R. 1036-1046, 1585-1601, 1573; 1996), she cannot now argue 
that they fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Strange v. 
Osthmd, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979); Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d'701, 702-703 
(Utah 1969); Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (Utah 1972). This rule applies 
to assertions that the affiant lacks personal knowledge, Strange, supra; Fox, supra; 
Howick, supra; that the affidavit is conclusory, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jones 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Utah App. 1988); Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1043-1044 (Utah 1983); that the entire 
affidavit is inadmissible because it was never notarized, Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 
685 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1984); or that it suffers from other problems apparent "on the 
face" of it. D&L Supply v Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiffs argument that Cassidy's affidavits are inadmissible because he did not 
say "I submit the following declaration under oath" is also purely semantic. Each of 
Cassidy's affidavits begins with the statement that Cassidy "makes the following 
affidavit." (R. 459 at p.l; 1421 at ^ 1; 1549 at p.l; 1641 at p.l). An affidavit is by 
definition "a declaration upon oath." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of 
the English Language, Unabridged (Second Edition 1978). It therefore makes no 
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difference whether Cassidy said "I make the following affidavit" or "I make the 
following declaration upon oath." The fact that plaintiff did not find Cassidy's affidavits 
to be objectionable in the trial court indicates the sufficiency of the language used. 
Plaintiffs assertion that Cassidy lacks the qualifications to opine about automobile 
airbag systems is equally lacking in merit. Cassidy is an "airbag systems engineer." (R. 
463 at ^ 21; 1425 at f 21). He obtained a degree in electrical engineering in 1980 and has 
worked in the automotive industry for thirty-three years, holding various engineering-
related positions. (R. 459-460 at 12; 1421-1422 at 12). He worked for fifteen years as a 
Product Analysis Senior Specialist at DCC (or its predecessor), and at one time was the 
manager of electrical engineering for the Jeep Division of American Motors. (R. 459-
460 at T| 2; 1421-1422 at f 2). He is familiar with industry practices in the design, testing 
and manufacturing of automobiles in general, and with the design of the Duster's airbag 
system in particular. (R. 459-460 at ffif 2, 9; 1421-1422 at fflf 2, 9). 
Cassidy's familiarity with the design of the Duster's airbag system is reflected in, 
and confirmed by, his minute knowledge of the individual components and operation of 
the Duster's airbag system, front sensors, ASDM, steering column, clockspring, and 
related elements. (See R. 460-461 at fflf 7-14; 1422-1423 at 1fl[ 7-14). Plaintiff admitted 
all of these details. (R. 1399-1400 at Iflf 5-11; 1587 at fflf 5-11). It is also plain that 
Cassidy is familiar with the manufacturing and testing of airbag components, the proper 
use of a DRB, and the correct procedure for diagnosing a fault in an airbag system. (R. 
1550-1554 at fflf 3, 6, 7, 10, 11; 1642-1648 at ffif 4-17). It is little wonder that plaintiff did 
not attempt to challenge Cassidy's qualifications in the trial court. 
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On appeal, plaintiff admits that the details Cassidy noticed when examining the 
Duster "would require a certain level of expertise." (Appellant's Brief at p. 14). In fact, 
plaintiff tries to buttress the qualifications of her expert by asserting (erroneously) that 
Barnett followed the same methodology as Cassidy when evaluating the Duster's airbag 
system. (Appellant's Brief at pp.28-29). 
As examples of Cassidy's purported lack of personal knowledge, plaintiff asserts 
that Cassidy's statement of the Duster's vehicle identification number ("VIN") and year 
of manufacture is "rank speculation." (Appellant's Brief at p.7). It is difficult to take this 
assertion seriously. Cassidy could determine the Duster's VIN because he inspected the 
Duster. (R. 462 at If 19; 1424 at If 19; 1550-1553 at ffl[ 4, 7, 9). Plaintiff also admitted the 
Duster's VIN and year of manufacture. (R. 1398 at 1 1 ; 1587 at f 1; see also 1041 at 12). 
Although plaintiff never objected to any statement in Cassidy's affidavits on 
evidentiary grounds, she did argue on procedural grounds that the court should not 
consider Cassidy's second supplemental affidavit submitted with defendants' reply 
memorandum. (R. 1999 at 13:21-14:12). Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in 
considering this affidavit because it purportedly "stated new facts that had not been raised 
in either of the prior motions for summary judgment." (Appellant's Brief at p.46). This 
argument errs in both premise and conclusion. 
Upon considering a motion for summary judgment, the court "may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented . . . by . . . further affidavits." Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. The 
trial court thus has discretion whether to allow supplemental affidavits. Vermont 
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P.I.R.G. v. United States. 247 F. Supp. 2d 495, 505 (D. Vt. 2002). Here, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in considering Cassidy's second supplemental affidavit. 
Plaintiff asserts that Cassidy "stated new facts" in his second supplemental 
affidavit which had not been raised earlier, because he "claimed that he had conducted 
specific tests on the alleged defective parts and found them to be defective [sic] free." 
(Appellant's Brief at p.46). This assertion is contradicted by the record. In his second 
supplemental affidavit, Cassidy merely described the tests (and their results) which had 
been made known to plaintiffs counsel in May of 2001, and which were summarized in 
Cassidy's original affidavit. 
Plaintiffs counsel was present when Cassidy inspected the Duster in March of 
2001 and gave permission for Cassidy to remove the sensors and ASDM for testing. (R. 
462 at ! 19; 1424 at 1j 19; 1641-1642 at 12). Counsel for DCC then forwarded the results 
of this testing to plaintiffs counsel in May of 2001. (R. 1441). Cassidy summarized the 
results of this testing in his original affidavit submitted in support of both the original and 
renewed motions for summary judgment. (R. 463 at f 21; 1425 at f 21). In his second 
supplemental affidavit, Cassidy simply explained the details of how this testing and 
electronic analysis were conducted. (R. 1461 at fflf 2-7). Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by accepting this supplemental affidavit. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT FROM 
CONDUCTING ANY TESTING. 
Plaintiff asserts that it was reversible error for the trial court to preclude Barnett 
from conducting additional testing and then to rule against plaintiff on the ground that 
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Barnett had not conducted sufficient testing. (Appellant's Brief at p.A, Argument Two; 
p.E, ]f 14; p.2 and p.50). This assertion lacks merit for two fundamental reasons. First, 
plaintiff never told the trial court that Barnett needed to do additional testing. Second, 
plaintiffs theory of the case rests upon the assertion that the DRB conclusively indicates 
the existence of defects in the airbag system and that no further testing is necessary. 
Plaintiff was required to designate her expert witnesses by June 2003. (R. 198 at | 
5; 349). Plaintiff having not properly disclosed an expert witness on liability by 
September 2003, defendants moved for summary judgment. (R. 441-794, 808-918). 
Plaintiff first sought an open-ended extension of time to respond to the motions, not to 
conduct testing; then filed her response supported by Barnett's affidavit and his 
"supplemental designation"; then moved to substitute Barnett for Dickson. (R. 919, 
1024-1051, 1073, 1272). 
Although noting that plaintiffs designation of Dickson was clearly inadequate; 
that plaintiff had failed to respond to requests for information regarding her experts; and 
that the case had already suffered extensive delays; the court nonetheless reluctantly 
allowed plaintiff to substitute Barnett for Dickson. (R. 1364; 1998 at 21:3-23:1). In 
doing so, however, the court carefully explained that Barnett would be restricted to the 
factual basis for the opinions stated in his original affidavit he possessed when he signed 
that affidavit. (R. 1998 at 22:13-19; 33:18-35:22; 37:5-9). Plaintiff neither objected nor 
made any comment regarding these restrictions. (See id. at 22:13-23:3; 33:25-37:15). 
Moreover, plaintiff believes that because the fault code scan of the airbag system 
indicated short circuits in various components, these components must be defective. 
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(Appellant's Brief at pp.1, 17; R. 1594-1595; 1048-1050 at ffl[ 11-13,23; 1534-1536 at ^ 
11-13, 23). Her expert flatly asserted that he need not examine the Duster or any 
components in order to determine conclusively that the airbag system was defective. (R. 
1603-1604. at Iffl 7, 8, 9). In fact, plaintiff asserted that a fault code scan is so simple that 
a "ninth grade drop-out" could perform the test. (R. 1598). In plaintiffs words, "The 
expert testimony required is not that of a rocket scientist". (R. 1598). 
At the hearing on the renewed motions for summary judgment, plaintiff repeatedly 
argued that the fault code scan conclusively showed the existence of defects in the airbag 
system. (R. 1999 at 14:13-19:4). It was plaintiffs position that Barnett needed to know 
only two things in order to determine conclusively that the airbag system was defective: 
that the airbag deployed, and "those readings on the computer". (Id. at 19:2-4; 20:5-13). 
Confronted by evidence that DCC tested the sensors and found them to be free from 
defects, plaintiff maintained her reliance on "that computer" as "the gospel on what 
happened on this airbag." (Id. at 25:8-12). Consistent with her position that the fault 
code scan conclusively showed the existence of defects in the airbag system, plaintiff 
never told the trial court that Barnett needed to do additional testing. (See R. 1999). 
Plaintiff cannot now reverse her position, raise a new issue on appeal, and argue that 
Barnett needs to do additional testing. 
Further, according to the plaintiff, "Mr. Barnett is merely a substitute witness for 
Dru Dickson" and is "merely the same witness with a new name". (R. 1233). If these 
statements are true, then Bamett had formulated his opinions in April of 2003 and needed 
to conduct no additional testing. (See R. 1233, 1274). 
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Thus, the court did not "preclude" Barnett from conducting additional testing 
because plaintiff never said that Barnett needed to perform additional testing. Rather, the 
court merely followed a common sense rule: "If Mr. Barnett [is] going to render all these 
opinions, he better have the basis for [them] when he made the opinions; otherwise, these 
motions are well taken." (R. 1999 at 35:12-15). That was well within the court's 
discretion. See Campbell Mack & Sessions v. Debrv, 38 P.3d 984, 988-989 (Utah App. 
2001) (request to conduct further discovery in response to motion for summary judgment 
is committed to court's discretion). 
IV. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO "SUBSTITUTE" 
BARNETT FOR DICKSON. 
The summary judgment in favor of DCC and Miller may be affirmed on the 
alternative basis that Barnett's affidavits are inadmissible because plaintiff should not 
have been allowed to "substitute" Barnett for Dickson. A judgment properly entered may 
be affirmed on appeal, for any reason raised in the trial court. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able 
Construction, Inc., 983 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah 1999). Whether the trial court erred in 
granting a motion to designate a substitute expert witness is a legal question which the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 565, 568 (Utah 1999). 
Here, the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to "substitute" Barnett for Dickson. 
When a party has properly designated an expert witness who unexpectedly 
becomes unavailable, a substitution may be allowed. Boice, supra, 982 P.2d at 568-569. 
However, when a party never properly designates his first expert witness, substitution of 
a new expert witness should not be allowed. This rule is supported by comparing Boice 
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to Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-1310 (Utah 1993). In Boice, a substitution was 
allowed because the original expert was properly disclosed and the motion to substitute 
was filed only eight days after the original expert decided not to testify and before 
discovery had closed. 982 P.2d at 568-569. In Arnold, however, the Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's refusal to consider on motion for summary judgment an affidavit 
submitted by an expert witness who was not properly designated. 846 P.2d at 1309-1310. 
Explaining the difference between Boice and Arnold, the Supreme Court in Boice 
observed that Boice had complied with the court's scheduling orders whereas Arnold had 
not. 982 P.2d at 569. 
An analogy also may be drawn to cases involving attempts to "supplement" an 
earlier expert report by a new report with entirely different opinions. In such situations, 
the attempt to file a "supplemental" report is not allowed. Keener v. United States, 181 
F.R.D. 639, 641 (D. Mont. 1998); Schweizer v. DeKalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 954 F. 
Supp. 1495, 1510 (D. Kan. 1997); Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 689, 694-695 (D. 
N.M. 2003); Coles v. Perry, 217 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Here, plaintiff never properly designated Dickson as an expert witness. Although 
expert reports were not required (R. 198 at Tj 5), the proper designation of an expert 
certainly requires more than a mere statement of his name and city of residence. To serve 
any purpose, it must also include his area of expertise and the general subject of his 
testimony. The deficiency in plaintiffs attempted designation of Dickson is underscored 
by the fact that when designating Barnett as a "supplemental" expert witness plaintiff 
provided his area of expertise and the general subject of testimony. (R. 1073-1080). 
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The trial court correctly found that plaintiff had not properly designated Dickson 
as an expert witness. In October 2003 the court observed: "the plaintiff has never 
identified an expert witness and the time for doing so has now expired." (R. 986 at n.l). 
In April 2004 the court further observed that Dickson had not been properly disclosed 
and that Dickson "could have been there to testify about the color of the road for all we 
know." (R. 1998 at 16:20 - 21:7). Although the court found these failures sufficient 
reason to justify striking Barnett's affidavit, it nonetheless granted the motion to 
substitute, believing this was a discretionary matter and a contrary ruling could be 
overturned on appeal. (Id. at 21:14-22). 
In so ruling, the court erred. Plaintiff having not properly designated Dickson as 
an expert witness, Barnett was not a "substitute" for anyone. Rather, Barnett was simply 
a newly designated expert witness, uncovered after defendants filed their motions for 
summary judgment. Nor did plaintiff "immediately" move to substitute Barnett upon 
learning of Dickson's disappearance. (See Appellant's Brief at p.E, ]flf 12-13). To the 
contrary, plaintiff learned that Dickson had moved before September 16, 2003 (R. 919); 
she did not file her "supplemental" designation of Barnett until November 3, 2003 (R. 
1073); and she did not move to "substitute" Barnett for Dickson until December 17, 2003 
(R. 1272), nearly six months after discovery had closed (R. 197 at 1J 2; 349). To allow a 
substitution on these facts is to nullify the disclosure requirements of Rule 26. 
Although stating that an order granting a motion to substitute expert witnesses is 
reviewed for "correctness," the Supreme Court in Boice also added that trial courts are 
afforded "very broad discretion in ruling on such a motion." 982 P.2d at 568. If the trial 
48 
court had discretion to consider plaintiffs motion to substitute Barnett for Dickson, when 
Dickson was never properly disclosed in the first place, the order allowing that 
substitution was an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused when an order exceeds the 
limits of reason. Debry, supra, 38 P.3d at 988. An order precluding a witness from 
testifying is appropriate when the disobedient party has demonstrated "persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process." Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 
274-275 (Utah 1997); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 
734, 736-738 (Utah 1977). 
Here, plaintiffs persistent dilatory tactics frustrated the judicial process at every 
step. Plaintiff did nothing to advance her case for over one year until the court threatened 
dismissal for failure to prosecute. (R. 54). She ignored discovery requests until the court 
granted DCC's motion to compel and ordered her to respond. (R. 151-152). Although 
plaintiff could have commenced discovery on March 12, 2002 (R. 69 at f 1), she did not 
in fact commence discovery until April 7, 2003 - the date upon which discovery was 
originally scheduled to be completed. (R. 261-292; see also 197 at f^ 2). She never 
answered interrogatories seeking the identity of her expert witnesses, despite the court 
order (R. 960 at f 10); she refused to identify Dickson as the person who disassembled 
the Duster despite three letters from defense counsel seeking to know who did this (R. 
933-939); and then, adding insult to injury, she relied upon Dickson's disappearance as 
grounds for seeking an open-ended extension of time to respond to the motions for 
summary judgment and as a basis upon which to "substitute" Barnett. (R, 919, 1272-
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1276). Given these facts, the order allowing plaintiff to substitute Barnett for Dickson 
was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, DCC and Miller respectfully ask the Court to affirm 
the entry of summary judgment, either on the grounds that Barnett's conclusory 
assertions fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact or on the grounds that Barnett 
should not have been allowed to submit affidavits in the first place. 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. PETTIT: We still don't really know that and— 
and if that's the truth, then why didn't he disclose i t — 
disclose that to us back in June of 2003? And why didn't he 
disclose it to us that he was having difficulty finding him? 
6 I It—it's just far too little far too late. 
"7 THE COURT: All right. Well, it's your motion to 
8 substitute. You get the last say, Mr. Walsh. Have you got 
9 anything besides, they did it wrong and I've had a hard time? 
10 MR. WALSH: When we learned that Mr. Dixon was 
11 unavailable in September, I think it's fair to say we, with 
12 great dispatch, we tried to find a new expert. We contacted 
13 Mr. Barnett in California, he instructed us as to how he 
14 wanted the information for his opinion. We immediately got on 
15 it. We didn't retain him until the very last minute, he said 
16 he wouldn't render opinion until he got money up front and he 
17 hadn't formulated an opinion and that's why the time was as 
18 late as it is, your Honor. 
19 I'd submit it, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Well, I'm 
21 prepared to rule on this. 
22 With regard to the plaintiff's motion to substitute 
23 expert witnesses, the plaintiff claims here that the expert 
24 that was originally retained, Mr. Dixon, has now become 
25 unavailable. And there's nothing in this record that would 
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suggest that Mr. Walsh knew about it before he had to get an 
affidavit to respond to the motions for summary judgment. 
The only real issue here is whether or not Mr. Dixon 
was named as an expert in the original designation, and he 
was; but—at least, he was listed as an expert. And—and 
clearly, the—the identification was inadequate. He didn't 
even say what he was going to be an expert on. 
And I know there were requests after that that were 
made to, clarify that and those were not responded to until we 
find out that Mr. Dixon has disappeared. If I had evidence 
that Mr. Dixon had not disappeared or that he in fact has been 
available or that he wasn't retained as an expert, I might be 
inclined to make a different ruling here, but I don't. 
I—so, when Mr. Dixon was named timely, he just 
wasn't identified properly and that is, frankly, is enough to 
deny the substitution, but I'm trying to be a realist here and 
that is, I know exactly what's going to happen by the 
appellate courts. They would say, well, the rules are rules, 
but. . . 
And, you know, maybe I'm particularly sensitive to 
that, but I just heard—heard one of those from the Supreme 
Court. And so what it boils down to is some more delay and 
this case has been pending four years, a few more months of 
delay isn't going to make much difference, assuming that Mr. 
Barnett's affidavit is sufficiently adequate to meet the 
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motions here. 
So, I'm going to allow the substitution, even 
though, Mr. Walsh, in all candor, I think it's—I think the 
way you've handled this is extremely poor. And you haven't 
done what you're supposed to. And I say once again, do not 
come down to this Court and say, Gee, I didn't do it right but 
neither did they. I just won't accept that anymore. I'm 
sorry, but it's just not going to work. 
But in any event, there's enough here so that 
there's no reason to send up to one of the courts to reverse 
me to send it back to try it again at a later date, assuming 
this is the trial of the case. 
Motion to substitute the expert witness is granted. 
Mr. Barnett has—and I assume he's done all that he's going to 
do because he's not going to get in anymore great discovery 
and get anything that he's done. He's made his opinions, you 
can depose him, find out what the bases are, assuming that his 
affidavit is sufficient to defeat these motions here today. 
And then we'll be done. Otherwise, discovery's completed. 
All right. That's the order with regard to the 
substitution of witnesses and it denies the motion to strike 
the supplemental—actually, the supplemental designation i s — 
is now moot, because the supplemental designation has become a 
motion to substitute. 
So, the objections by the various defendants to the 
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Gregory Barnett affidavit is denied. 
All right. Let's hear the motions. I'll hear 
Chrysler's motion first. 
MR. HOLT: Your Honor, I think|your ruling probably 
moots my motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. Motion denied. 
MR. HOLT: Going—going to attempt to get a 
deposition, I think we need to do that first and perhaps I 
would request the Court to postpone ruling on that motion 
until we take his deposition and then if I find it 
appropriate, I'll supplement the motion. 
THE COURT: No. What I want is a new motion. 
MR. HOLT: All right. 
THE COURT: Doesn't do me—I'm not going to read all 
this, you know— 
MR. HOLT: That's fine. 
THE COURT: —ten inches of material all again three 
months from now. 
MR. HOLT: That's fine. I'll do it that way then, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, what about Larry 
Miller? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, as I indicated, we have a 
separate basis for motion for summary judgment that doesn't 
get into the issues surrounding expert witnesses. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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JODY BEST, ORDER GRANTING 
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DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, et. al, 
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The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants DaimlerChrysler Corporation 
and Larry H. Miller, came on for hearing before this Honorable Court on January 24, 
2005. After reviewing all Briefs and Affidavits in support of and opposed to the relief 
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prayed in those Motions, hearing arguments of Counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiff has identified one expert witness, Gregory Barnett, to testify against 
Defendants on all liability issues. 
2. Plaintiffs only identified expert witness related to liability has not inspected 
the subject vehicle nor any components of said vehicle, which at any time existed on the 
subject vehicle. Mr. Barnett has based his opinions in this matter solely upon review of a 
videotape of an inspection of certain data recording equipment conducted by others. 
3. The actual airbag system components of the subject vehicle, which Mr. 
Barnett concludes from the review of the videotape were defective and caused Plaintiffs 
injuries, were individually tested and found not to be defective. The Affidavit of 
Defendants' Expert Witness, Michael Cassidy, related to the evaluation and testing of 
these individual airbag components, is uncontested. Therefore, the Court concludes there 
is no question of fact remaining on Plaintiffs theories of Liability or Causation. 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Plaintiffs Brief and Affidavits in opposition to 
Defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment do not create a relevant, material, or 
substantive issue of fact, and judgment must therefore and hereby is entered granting 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and dismissing with prejudice all claims of 
Plaintiff against DaimlerChrysler Corporation and Larry H. Miller. 
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1 I SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JANUARY 24, 2005 
2 JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSEN PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: The record will show that we are in 
5 session in the matter styled Best versus Daimler Chrysler, 
6 and others. It's case number 000909904. Appearances please. 
7 MR. WALSH: John Walsh on behalf of plaintiff, Jody 
8 Best who is also present with her husband, Ross, to my left. 
9 MR. JONES: Good morning, Your Honor, Peter Jones 
10 and Nathan Alder on behalf of Daimler Chrysler Corporation 
11 and the dealership, Larry Miller. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MS. PETTIT: Kara Pettit here on behalf of Dan 
14 Worth. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I have a Renewed Motion for 
16 Summary Judgment on a number of issues that were authorized 
17 at the taking of plaintiff's expert's deposition. I have 
18 Chrysler's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Larry 
19 Miller's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, and Worth's 
20 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. I've read the materials 
21 that have been submitted, both in support of and in response 
22 to the renewed motions and so I will be pleased to hear from 
23 the counsel. How do you want to proceed? Does Chrysler want 
24 to go first? 
25 MR. JONES: If that is to your satisfaction, Your 
in wrong." Well, that isn't enough. That's not going to any 
jury. That's not enough. And so the motion for negligent 
repair as to Dan Worth is granted as well. There's just no 
evidence to support a claim for negligence of repair in the 
record at this point in time. 
And I don't think you can claim, as a plaintiff, 
"Well, somebody else might put some evidence in that they 
are, but we don't know what it might be, they're just 
claiming it was," and have that get past a motion. That's 
just not going to work. If we were at the end of the 
plaintiff's case and there wasn't any evidence more than in 
the record now, then there wouldn't be any claim for 
negligent repair. I couldn't submit it to a jury. 
The issue with regard to the strict liability 
claims and defective part claims, as to Chrysler and Miller, 
the dealer, is not as straight forward but, counsel, as I 
look through this, even taking into account everything that's 
been said here, really what I've got from the plaintiff is, 
the plaintiff's expert is, "I looked at the computer, the 
computer said that the two front sensors are at fault and 
that's, and the airbag deployed. Therefore, the two front 
sensors are defective, and that's my opinion. And we as 
mechanics all rely upon these computers." Well, fine. But 
unfortunately, there is no evidence that rebuts what the 
evidence is after the computer readout showed it was 
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1 defective, but they were not defective. The evidence is 
2 I apparently unrebutted, that even though the computer says 
3 these two front sensors were defective and the airbag 
4 deployed, we all know that, that the two front sensors were 
5 not defective. And so computer was wrong. And I don't think 
6 this case can go to a jury on, "My, the computer says it's 
7 so, therefore it is." Wrong. Computers don't work 
8 sometimes. Computers are wrong sometimes. And I don't buy 
9 off that Mr. Barnett is a computer wizard along with being a 
10 computer expert and everything else. And so, the only 
11 evidence I've got is that after the onboard computer said 
12 there was a defect, the testing showed there was no defect. 
13 The only logical conclusion of that is that the computer was 
14 wrong. 
15 Motion for summary judgment on all the remaining 
16 claims against, or the strict liability claims and the 
17 negligence claims against Chrysler and Miller are granted as 
18 well. Plaintiffs just haven't shown that there is a 
19 relationship between the failure of the, the alleged failure 
20 of the front sensors, and the deployment of this airbag, 
21 because these front sensors weren't defective. And if one of 
22 the appellate courts wants to say that computers are 
23 infallible and can't ever make a mistake and you're entitled 
24 to rely upon it, then so be it, but we're not going to try 
25 this case to find that out because I don't think it can. 
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1 Prepare an appropriate order from both defendants 
2 outlining the reasons that I'm dismissing this matter and 
3 then if somebody else wants to look at it, fine. But at this 
4 point and time I can't come to any other conclusion other 
5 than the fact that there's just not sufficient evidence to 
6 conclude that these two front sensors were defective as 
7 I claimed by the plaintiff. In fact, the evidence is all to 
the contrary and it's undisputed. 
9 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript m 
the before mentioned proceedings held before Judge Timothy 
Hanson was transcribed by me from a video recording and 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth m the preceding pages to the best 
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Tab 5 
T RESTRAINT SYSTEMS 8M - 7 
Fig 10 Clockspnng (Auto-Locking) 
STEERING WHEEL 
WARNING: BEFORE BEGINNING ANY AIR BAG 
SYSTEM REMOVAL OR INSTALLATION PROCE-
DURES, REMOVE AND ISOLATE THE BATTERY 
NEGATIVE (-) CABLE (GROUND) FROM THE VEHI-
CLE BATTERY. THIS IS THE ONLY SURE WAY TO 
DISABLE THE AIR BAG SYSTEM. FAILURE TO DO 
THIS COULD RESULT IN ACCIDENTAL AIR BAG 
DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE PERSONAL INJURY. 
WHEN AN UNDEPLOYED AIR BAG ASSEMBLY 
IS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STEERING 
WHEEL DISCONNECT BATTERY GROUND CA 
BLE AND ISOLATE ALLOW SYSTEM CAPACI-
TOR TO DISCHARGE FOR TWO MINUTES 
BEGIN AIR BAG REMOVAL 
REMOVAL 
(1) Make sure front wheels are straight and steer 
mg column is locked in place 
(2) Disconnect battery negative cable and isolate 
(3) Wait two minutes for the reserve capacitor to 
discharge before removing undeployed module 
(4) Remove four nuts attaching air bag module 
from the back side of steering wheel 
(5) Lift module and disconnect connector from rear 
of module 
(6) Remove speed control switch and connector if 
so equipped or cover 
(7) Remove steering wheel retaining nut 
(8) Remove steering wheel with steering wheel 
puller Tool C 3428B 
INSTALLATION 
(1) If the clockspnng is not properly positioned or 
if front wheels were moved follow the clockspnng 
centering procedure before installing steering wheel 
With the front wheels in the straight ahead position 
Position the steering wheel on the steering column 
Making sure to fit the flats on the hub of the steer 
mg wheel with the formations on the inside of the 
clockspnng Pull the air bag and speed control wires 
through the lower larger hole m the steering wheel 
and the horn wire through smaller hole at the top 
Make sure not to pinch wires (Fig 11) 
AIR BAG MODULE HORN WIRE CLOCKSPR1NG 
WIRE WIRING 918M-13 
Fig. 11 Steering Wheel Wiring 
(2) Install retaining nut and tighten to 61 N»m (45 
ft lbs) torque 
(3) Connect horn wiring lead 
(4) Connect 4-way connector to speed control 
switch and attach switch to steering wheel 
(5) Connect air bag lead wire to air bag module, 
and secure module to steering wheel 
(6) Do not connect negative battery cable Refer to 
Air Bag System Check for proper procedure 
STEERING COLUMN SWITCHES 
This procedure covers the removal and installation 
of the steering wheel and clockspnng Once the 
steering wheel and clockspnng have been removed, 
refer to the appropriate section of this service man-
ual for switch replacement 
WARNING BEFORE BEGINNING ANY AIR BAG 
SYSTEM REMOVAL OR INSTALLATION PROCE-
DURES, REMOVE AND ISOLATE THE BATTERY 
NEGATIVE (-) CABLE (GROUND) FROM THE VEHI-
CLE BATTERY. THIS IS THE ONLY SURE WAY TO 
DISABLE THE AIR BAG SYSTEM. FAILURE TO DO 
THIS COULD RESULT IN ACCIDENTAL AIR BAG 
DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE INJURY 
WHEN AN UNDEPLOYED AIR BAC ASSEMBLY 
IS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STEERING 
WHEEL DISCONNECT BATTERY GROUND CA-
BLE AND ISOLATE ALLOW SYSTEM CAPACI 
BSK 0020 
Best v DaimlerChrysiar » 
Corporation ( H ft 
This diagram was authenticated by Michael Cassidy and submitted with his original 
affidavit. (R. 460-461 atf 12; R. 466; 1422-1423 at If 12; R. 1427). 
Tab 6 
TILT LEVER UPPER SHROUD BRAKE PEDAL BRACKET 
STEERING 
WHEEL NUT 
SHIM (IF REQUIRED) 
LOWER DASH PANEL 
SUPPORT BRACKET 
COUPLER BOLT 
RETAINING PIN 
COVER AND 
SHIELD 
STEERING 
WHEEL 
LOWER 
SHROUD STEERING SHAFT 
SEAL 
DASH 
PANEL 
LOWER 
COUPLING 
SPRING 
PIN 
STEERING GEAR' 
TO AIR BAG 
TROUGH FEED 
Fig. 1 Acustar Standard and Tilt Steering Column 
9219-71 
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This diagram was authenticated by Michael Cassidy and submitted with his original 
affidavit. (R. 461 a t l 13; R. 471; 1423 atf 13; R. 1430). 
